What do the funding rate and margin of a prediction-market perpetual become when the index is a conditional or a basket?
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- On the presidential pair the funding correction averaged 0.076 per year against a base term of 0.116, and exceeded it in absolute value on 50 percent of the days.
- The conditional index's half-spread grows as 1/P(B); the listing floor for a five-cent tolerance is 0.148 at half a tick per leg and 0.296 at the effective spread.
- The one-day 99 percent loss on a unit conditional position rises from 0.083 at P(B) = 0.5 to 0.48 at P(B) = 0.01.
- At a matched 99 percent one-day shock the base grid charges 1.48 times the stress margin on a long basket and 1.80 times on a spread; at fixed ten-point shocks the ratios are 3.7 and 4.6.
- Biden's nomination leg fell from 0.29 to zero in one day, after the joint market had traded above it on 29 of 189 days by up to 14 cents.
Summary
A derivative on a ratio of two markets
Prediction markets such as Kalshi and Polymarket list one kind of contract. It pays one if an event happens and nothing otherwise. In an earlier paper we built a perpetual future on a single such market, held to the market's probability index by a funding stream, and priced European options on the index off a logit-normal terminal law. A grid of probability and volatility shocks margined a book of both. Few of the risks a trader would want to hedge involve one market. Nechepurenko (2026b) classified the contracts that can be written on more than one market and proved a qualitative result for each, but priced none of them. This paper does the pricing for the conditional and the basket. The other five designs fold into those two or into the base case.
The conditional contract
The conditional index is the probability of A given B. On a venue it is the ratio of the joint market's price to the conditioning market's price. Under the measure conditioned on B it is a martingale. Under the pricing measure it drifts, and in a bivariate logit model the drift is a correlation term, -ρσcσb c(1-c)(1-b). The funding rate of a perpetual on the ratio is therefore the single-market identity plus a correction of that size with the opposite sign.
We calibrated two nested Polymarket pairs from 2024. The presidential pair sets the market on a Republican winning both the popular vote and the presidency against the market on Trump winning the presidency. There the correction averaged 0.076 per year against a base term whose mean absolute value was 0.116. Figure 1 plots both parts. The correction was positive every day and exceeded the base term in absolute value on 50 percent of the days. The sweep pair sets Trump winning every swing state against a Republican winning Pennsylvania. There the correlation was -0.13, and the correction averaged -0.117 against a base term of 0.563, about a sixth of it. The signs were opposite on the two pairs.
The ratio's sensitivity to its legs grows without bound as the conditioning price nears zero. We find that the funding rate and its correction stay bounded through that limit. What breaks is the mark. An index backed out of two quoted legs carries a half-spread of (s_q + c s_b)/P(B), and the division makes it unquotable as P(B) falls. Table 3 gives the consequence. At half a tick per leg, the lowest conditioning probability at which a venue could quote the index within a five-cent tolerance is 0.148. At the effective half-spread of about a cent that Dubach (2026) measures on Polymarket's tape, that floor is 0.296. Margin moves the same way once each leg carries tick noise. The one-day 99 percent loss on a unit position rises from 0.083 at P(B) = 0.5 to 0.48 at P(B) = 0.01.
Only one conditioning leg in our data went to zero, and Figure 3 shows it. Biden's 2024 nomination market fell from 0.29 to zero on 22 July in a single day, after three weeks in which the joint market on Trump and Biden both being nominated traded above the Biden leg itself. That happened on 29 of 189 days, by up to 14 cents, so the ratio exceeded one and no logit volatility can be estimated for it. A floor at the levels above would have closed the contract before the jump, and the jump itself is a roll.
Options on the conditional index are priced by the base pricer with no change when the option is void if B fails, and with one drift term when it is cash-settled. Table 2 shows how little the two conventions differ.
The basket and its margin
For a basket on several events, funding is the weighted sum of the legs' single-market identities. Correlation enters only the margin, and that is where the base case's grid is weakest, since it charges every event's adverse move at once with one dimension per event. We compare the grid against the most probable stress, found by minimising the rate function of the seven-dimensional logit diffusion calibrated to the seven 2024 swing-state markets, whose logit innovations have a mean pairwise correlation of 0.38.
Figure 4 shows what the two methods do. For an equal-weight long basket the most probable stress moves every state down together, while the grid corner moves each by the full ten points. For a long Pennsylvania, short Michigan spread the stress moves the two legs apart by 5.7 and 4.0 points and leaves the others close to zero, while the grid moves them apart by ten points each. Table 6 puts numbers on the difference. At a matched 99 percent one-day shock the grid charges 1.48 times the stress margin on the long basket, 1.80 times on the spread and 1.58 times on a covered-call book. With the base case's fixed ten-point shocks the ratios to the simulated 99 percent loss are 3.7, 4.6 and 6.2. The stress margin itself matched the simulated quantile, 0.0272 against 0.0272 for the one-day long basket. Under equal correlation the overcharge has a closed form, √(K/(1+(K-1)ρ)) for the basket and √(2/(1-ρ)) for the spread, and Figure 5 plots both against the exact book loss as the correlation varies.
What we did not see
The path we did not see is a conditioning event that declines slowly to a few percent while both legs keep trading. The sweep of Section 4.4 models that path, and the one decline we found in 2024 was a jump. Whether a venue would keep quoting both legs through a slow decline is a question of market making, and we leave it open.
Who this is for: Researchers and quants working on prediction-market derivatives, along with investors and journalists who follow those venues.
Figures
Tables
| variant | tracked quantity | funding | option pricer | margin | where |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| conditional | P(A | B) | base identity in c plus ρσcσb c(1-c)(1-b) | base pricer under QB; one drift term under Q | bounded in logit shocks; the mark is not | Section 4 |
| basket | Σk wk pk | Σk wk f(pk, σk) | simulation; no closed form | most probable stress on the joint diffusion | Section 5 |
| spread | p1 - p2 | basket with w = (1, -1) | basket | basket; the grid's worst case | Sections 5, 6 |
| variance | realised variance of ℓ or of p | none (settles at T) | σ² T; a time integral of the base pricer | not treated | Section 6 |
| entropy | H(pT') | none | base pricer with a concave payoff | not treated | Section 6 |
| funding-only | ∫ fdt | the contract | one quadrature | not treated | Section 6 |
| expiring markets | p(n)t, rolled | base identity within each market | base pricer | base grid | Section 6 |
| T' | K | void if B fails | cash-settled | difference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 month | 0.3 | 0.1927 | 0.1873 | -0.0054 |
| 1 month | 0.4 | 0.1187 | 0.1142 | -0.0045 |
| 1 month | 0.5 | 0.0626 | 0.0592 | -0.0034 |
| 1 month | 0.6 | 0.0264 | 0.0251 | -0.0013 |
| 1 month | 0.7 | 0.0083 | 0.0077 | -0.0006 |
| 3 months | 0.3 | 0.2165 | 0.2045 | -0.0120 |
| 3 months | 0.4 | 0.1512 | 0.1415 | -0.0097 |
| 3 months | 0.5 | 0.1002 | 0.0915 | -0.0087 |
| 3 months | 0.6 | 0.0596 | 0.0543 | -0.0053 |
| 3 months | 0.7 | 0.0294 | 0.0268 | -0.0026 |
| half-spread per leg | what it is | index half-spread at b = 0.5 | at b = 0.1 | floor, 5-cent tolerance | floor, 10-cent tolerance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.5 cents | half a tick | 1.5 cents | 7.4 cents | 0.148 | 0.074 |
| 1.0 cent | effective spread paid, 2026 | 3.0 cents | 14.8 cents | 0.296 | 0.148 |
| 1.9 cents | median quoted spread, live markets, 2026 | 5.6 cents | 28.1 cents | 0.563 | 0.281 |
| b0 | funding, total | correction | implied half-spread | grid on the legs | feasible corners | model and logit stress, 99% | with tick noise, 99% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.50 | 0.123 | 0.087 | 0.015 | 0.247 | 49 | 0.082 | 0.083 |
| 0.30 | 0.158 | 0.122 | 0.025 | 0.370 | 48 | 0.082 | 0.086 |
| 0.20 | 0.175 | 0.140 | 0.037 | 0.327 | 37 | 0.082 | 0.090 |
| 0.10 | 0.192 | 0.157 | 0.074 | 0.341 | 23 | 0.082 | 0.108 |
| 0.05 | 0.201 | 0.166 | 0.148 | 0.454 | 17 | 0.082 | 0.154 |
| 0.03 | 0.205 | 0.169 | 0.247 | 0.370 | 10 | 0.082 | 0.217 |
| 0.02 | 0.206 | 0.171 | 0.370 | 0.401 | 10 | 0.082 | 0.295 |
| 0.01 | 0.208 | 0.173 | 0.741 | 0.437 | 10 | 0.082 | 0.481 |
| pair | joint leg q | conditioning leg b | days | b range | c range | σc | σb | ρ | correction, mean per year | base term, mean abs. | days q > b |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| presidential | Republican wins popular vote and presidency | Trump wins presidency | 172 | 0.44 to 0.71 | 0.40 to 0.82 | 2.72 | 1.31 | 0.20 | 0.076 | 0.116 | 0 |
| nomination | Trump and Biden both nominated | Biden nominated | 189 | 0.13 to 0.91 | 0.90 to 1.37 | not estimable | 5.43 | not estimable | not estimable | not estimable | 29 |
| sweep | Trump wins every swing state | Republican wins Pennsylvania | 115 | 0.42 to 0.67 | 0.28 to 0.89 | 4.54 | 1.76 | -0.13 | -0.117 | 0.563 | 0 |
| book | h | grid as written | matched grid | most probable stress | simulated 99% | matched / stress | grid / simulated |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| long basket | 1 day | 0.100 | 0.0401 | 0.0272 | 0.0272 | 1.48 | 3.68 |
| long basket | 5 days | 0.100 | 0.0893 | 0.0607 | 0.0604 | 1.47 | 1.66 |
| spread PA-MI | 1 day | 0.200 | 0.0782 | 0.0434 | 0.0434 | 1.80 | 4.61 |
| spread PA-MI | 5 days | 0.200 | 0.1755 | 0.0973 | 0.0968 | 1.81 | 2.07 |
| covered basket | 1 day | 0.0938 | 0.0232 | 0.0147 | 0.0151 | 1.58 | 6.21 |
| covered basket | 5 days | 0.0938 | 0.0590 | 0.0369 | 0.0382 | 1.60 | 2.45 |
Abstract
Majumdar (2026a) built a perpetual future and options on a single binary prediction market from three parts: a funding-rate identity that holds the perpetual's mark on the market's probability index, a logit-normal pricer for European options on that index, and a scenario-grid portfolio margin. Nechepurenko (2026b) classified the contracts that can be written on more than one market and proved, for each, a qualitative result; none of them is priced there. We price them. The conditional index $P(A|B)$ is a martingale under the measure conditioned on $B$, and under the pricing measure it drifts. In a bivariate logit model the drift is $-\rho\sigma_c\sigma_b c(1-c)(1-b)$, so the funding rate of a perpetual on it is the single-market identity plus a correction of that size and the opposite sign. On the two nested Polymarket pairs from 2024 that we could calibrate, the correction was a sixth of the base term on one and the larger of the two on half the days on the other. It stays bounded as the conditioning probability falls to zero. What breaks is the mark: an index backed out of two quoted legs carries a half-spread of $(s_q + c\,s_b)/P(B)$, and the one-day 99 percent loss on a unit position rises from 0.083 at $P(B) = 0.5$ to 0.48 at $P(B) = 0.01$. At half a tick per leg the listing floor for a five-cent tolerance is 0.15; at the effective half-spread of about a cent measured on Polymarket's tape it is 0.30. On the one pair whose conditioning leg did fall to zero, Biden's 2024 nomination, the joint market traded above its own conditioning leg on 29 of 189 days, by up to 14 cents, and the leg went from 0.29 to zero in one day. Options on the conditional index are priced by the single-market pricer verbatim when the option is void if $B$ fails, and with one drift term otherwise. For the basket, funding is the weighted sum of the legs' identities. Correlation enters only the margin, and there we compare the one-dimension-per-event grid against the most probable stress found by minimising the rate function of the seven-dimensional logit diffusion, calibrated to the seven 2024 swing-state markets, whose logit innovations have a mean pairwise correlation of 0.38. At a matched 99 percent one-day shock the grid charges 1.48 times the stress margin on a long basket, 1.80 times on a long-short spread and 1.58 times on a covered-call book; with the fixed ten-point shocks of the base case the ratios to the simulated 99 percent loss are 3.7, 4.6 and 6.2. Under equal correlation the gap is $\sqrt{K/(1+(K-1)\rho)}$ for the basket and $\sqrt{2/(1-\rho)}$ for the spread.
Keywords: prediction markets, event-linked perpetual futures, funding rate, conditional probability, basket contracts, correlation, portfolio margin, large deviations, Polymarket
How to cite
Majumdar, A. (2026). Conditional and Basket Event-Linked Perpetual Futures: Funding Rates, Pricing and Correlation-Aware Margin. SSRN Working Paper No. 7646159. https://ssrn.com/abstract=7646159
@techreport{majumdar_a_taxonomy_of_event_linked_perpetual_futures_variant_designs_beyond_the_single_m,
author={Majumdar, Anirban},
title={Conditional and Basket Event-Linked Perpetual Futures: Funding Rates, Pricing and Correlation-Aware Margin},
institution={SSRN},
number={7646159},
year={2026},
url={https://ssrn.com/abstract=7646159}}